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The Pure Act of Recollection
Walter Benjamin and Maurice Blanchot Reading Proust
Yanik Avila
1 For  Walter  Benjamin,  as  for  Maurice  Blanchot,  the  philosophical  stakes  linked  to
literature as a specific discourse or mode of language lie in the problematic status it
assigns to subjectivity. In the context of his early literary studies, working on Goethe’s
Elective Affinities, Benjamin postulates a “basic law of literature”, which states that within
a  literary  work  “truth  content”  [Wahrheitsgehalt]  and  “material  content”  [Sachgehalt]
initially intertwine.1 According to Benjamin,  it  is  the task of  critique to aim at truth
content, and thereby to extract the work from its embedding in a ‘real’ world. Moreover,
the process of this extraction is the measure of the historical time encapsulated in the
work, as Benjamin writes, using a Bergsonian term: its “duration”.2
2 As Michel Foucault suggests, for Blanchot, the utterly reduced, pure self-assertion of the
literary  discourse  of  modernity  –  its  refusal  to  be  limited  by  any  meaning  or
communication  that  could  be  subtracted  from  its  form  –  can  be  seen  as  the
“breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded”.3 This event is manifest
in the paradoxical ontological structure of the work of art, more particularly the literary
work, as Blanchot approaches it.
3 However different they may appear,  these two figures of thought are both organised
around a fundamental separation that excludes the ‘work’, the literary work, from the
world of realities, and hence from the course of history, of subjectivity qua historical
action. Nevertheless, it is through this very exclusion that both Blanchot and Benjamin
aim at another dimension of historicity, one in which the work refuses to relate to the
subject,  to  a  transcendental  and thus a-historical  subject,  namely:  the subject  of  the
(Kantian)  transcendental  synthesis.  The  very  structure  of  literary  works  implies  a
thorough resistance to history – understood here as the realm of subjective actions, of
purposes and progression in time. By refusing to relate to productive subjectivity, literary
works refuse to coincide with subjective purposes, and are therefore at odds with the
very idea of a transcendental (and thus naturalised) subject of history – a privileged point
of  view  that  holds  everything  together.4 However,  this  refusal,  for  Benjamin  as  for
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Blanchot, takes place when the discourse of literature, bereft of its ties to a real,  i.e.
experienceable  historical  world, repeats  the  pure  (and  hence  empty)  gesture  of
transcendental  synthesis.  As  the  reduplication,  or  simulation  of  a  synthetic  activity
without  a  subject,  literature,  thus  at  once  transforms  the  inmost  intimacy  of
consciousness into an extreme exteriority.
4 Marcel Proust’s work À la Recherche du temps perdu puts precisely this gesture to the test
because it represents a comprehensive attempt at transforming pure consciousness into
narration.  As such it  confronts the subject of reading with an experience that,  in its
immanence, is radically unapproachable. It is in deciphering this unapproachability of
experience as part of the predicament of subjectivity in modernity that Benjamin and
Blanchot, in their readings of Proust, propose notions of historical cognition that hinge
on the instant where the subject of historical action is inverted into its image, into the
utter passivity that is ascribed to nature.
 
Benjamin (I): Body-Space
5 One of Benjamin’s main claims in his 1929 essay, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the
European  Intelligentsia”,  refers  to  an  instant  of  “bodily  collective  innervation”  that
emerges from the coinciding of a “sphere of images” and a “sphere of bodies”.5 It seems
that this juxtaposition implies a trope, a metaphorical operation. Benjamin outlines this
metaphorical nexus more explicitly elsewhere, in a note contained in “Convolute K” of
the Arcades-Project,  in which he considers a transformation of a particular realm that
could be described as ‘second nature’ into history proper. Invoking a basic assumption of
psychoanalysis, he spells out its implications in terms of the opposition of sleeping and
waking:
It is one of the tacit suppositions of psychoanalysis that the clear-cut antithesis of
sleeping  and  waking  has  no  value  for  determining  the  empirical  form  of
consciousness of the human being, but instead yields before an unending variety of
concrete  states  of  consciousness  conditioned  by  every  conceivable  level  of
wakefulness within all possible centers.6 
6 While the metaphorical operation in the essay on Surrealism modifies the meaning of the
term ‘body’ – “The collective is a body, too”7 – the decisive term here is ‘consciousness’.
But it is not the account of a transcendental consciousness, as defined by the Cartesian
tradition of a philosophy of mind in terms of a res cogitans without extension; rather, the
‘form’  of  consciousness,  which  is  at  stake  here,  is  one  that  Benjamin  refers  to  as
‘empirical’.8 The aim is thus to undo the separation between body and consciousness, to
see it as a result rather than an essential factor. This view links Benjamin’s account of
consciousness to one of the main insights of psychoanalysis: the idea of an immanent
consciousness, i.e. a consciousness that is not separable from its alleged other, the body,
and therefore endowed with extension. In the terminology of Freudian metapsychology
this supposition finds a rather concise formulation: it is the assumption that “mental life
is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended
in  space  and  of  being  made  up  of several  portions  […].”9 However,  by  avoiding  a
transcendental account of consciousness – an account in which the unity of consciousness
is  secured by a sphere of  pure noumena,  which govern the (individual)  body from a
sovereign place external to it10 – Benjamin (as well as Freud) challenge the very notion of
an individual body and its unity.
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7 As a corollary of this conception of consciousness, we find an idea, or rather an image of
the individual body, which is already a fiction: an internal space or landscape – the result
of a process of extension, inflation and magnification of the space of the body. Viewed
against this background, the operation that Benjamin performs is by no means altogether
exterior  to  the  psychoanalytic  premise.  Even  if  he  goes  on  to  formulate  it  in  the
vocabulary  of  an  established “situation”,11 the  transfer  here  is  by  no  means  a  mere
metaphor, since such a metaphor would rely on an already constituted individual mind
occupying a sovereign position. Moreover it would presuppose a body that constitutes
itself as one, i.e. as a coherent entity that is attributable to the mind and is, at least in
principle,  at  its  command.  Rather,  spelling  out  the  implications  of  psychoanalysis’
immanent conception of mental life, Benjamin seems to focus on the very movement –
the  shift  of  the  boundary  between  mind  and  body  –  between  consciousness  and  a
corporeality that constitutes itself by evading the intentionality of consciousness in a
manner that makes it appear as nature. It is here that Benjamin suggests a conception of
the unconscious that is eminently historical, or, more appropriately perhaps: an idea of
history that redefines the relation of consciousness to a sphere of being-in-itself, which
Benjamin  names  ‘nature’,  a  relation  that,  for  the  time  being,  is  given  as  a  strict
separation:
Of course, much that is external to the former [the individual] is internal to the
latter [the collective]: architecture, fashion – yes, even the weather – are, in the
interior of the collective, what the sensoria of organs, the feeling of sickness or
health, are inside the individual. And so long as they preserve this unconscious,
amorphous dream configuration, they are as much natural processes as digestion,
breathing, and the like. They stand in the cycle of the eternally selfsame, until the
collective seizes upon them in politics and history emerges.12
8 ‘History’ therefore emerges as an event that takes place at the very juncture between
consciousness and its outside. This outside is perhaps more internal than the traditional
subject-object paradigm of the philosophy of mind suspects. If the mind is composed of
several portions, of multiple extended elements that relate to, communicate with, confine
and restrict each other, then this consciousness becomes a body-space that is essentially
itself an exteriority, an outside. The direction of the interrogation might therefore also
have  to  be  reversed;  one  would  no  longer  have  to  ask:  how  is  a  collective  body
conceivable? Instead one would have to ask: what is the nature of this fiction, that is, the
fiction of the individual, self-contained body? 
 
Blanchot (I): Imaginary Space
9 In his television interview, L’abécécaire,13 when prompted by Claire Parnet to comment on
the letter ‘D’ (as in ‘desire’), Gilles Deleuze formulates a resolute objection to an abstract
notion of desire, which, he claims, is maintained by psychoanalysis. Its abstractness lies in
the idea that desire is and has to be directed at an object – something or somebody – that
can be isolated. In contrast, Deleuze takes his cue from Proust when he says that desire, in
fact, cannot but take place within an assembly, an aggregate [un agencement]. He reminds
us of the way in which Proust’s objects of desire, be they persons or things, are always
framed by the spaces in which they appear – objects that are tied to their background or,
as  it  were,  enveloped by landscapes,  drawing all  their  affective substance from such
framing.  Here  Deleuze’s  description  resonates  with  Benjamin’s  account,  referenced
above, of the shift from the individual body to the collective, from nature to history. Like
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Deleuze,  Georges Poulet,  in his 1963 study on Proustian space,  points out this locale-
bound quality of Proust’s characters:
Without the locales, the characters would be mere abstractions. The locales specify
their image and provide us with the necessary support thanks to which we can
assign them a place in our mental space, dream of them, and remember them.14
10 However,  the philosopher Deleuze seems to go one step beyond Poulet’s  philological
observation when he makes a claim about the structure of desire tout court. While Poulet
speaks of a ‘mental space’ that is extracted from the world of objects, reproducing them
as ‘images’, Deleuze claims that what he calls ‘assembly’ is not the object of desire, since
desire is not external to it, but indissolubly interwoven with it. The contrast becomes all
the more visible when Poulet affirms a substantial difference between the exteriority of
the characters in Proust’s narration and the interiority of the ‘central consciousness’,
which is  that  of  the narrator:  “Oddly enough,  this  novelist  of  interiority relentlessly
forces  himself  to  present  his  personages  (with  the  exception  of  one,  the  central
consciousness) in terms of exteriority.”15 For Deleuze, it seems, desire works across the
separation between the imaginary and the real, between reading and experiencing; but if
the subject of desire is immanent to the text to begin with, if it is, ultimately, identical
with the unfolding of the narration, it is because narration itself, for Deleuze, does not
pose  a  problem.  For  Poulet,  however,  it  does.  But  he  sidesteps  its  consequences  by
granting the central consciousness – the subject of narration – the interiority that the
objects are lacking, as if, in turn, it presented an immediate interior experience. But the
intensification of this interiority through the immanence of narrative must lead to the
point where it is no longer the interiority of a subject, but rather pure interiority; and as
such it is inverted into an utter exteriority, into text. This inversion is the pivotal point
for Maurice Blanchot’s reading of Proust.
11 For Proust, the production of experience through an unfolding of narration seems to be
the aesthetic ambition at the heart of À la Recherche du temps perdu. In his essay on “The
Experience  of  Proust”,  Maurice  Blanchot  is  concerned  with  the  question  of  a  “pure
narrative”,16 as posed in Proust’s writing. What does ‘pure narrative’  mean? Blanchot
seems to suggest that it can be understood when compared with the form of the novel.
That is to say, Blanchot invests the novel as a literary form with a very specific ambition:
that of presenting a world which is a consistent, albeit fictional whole; a world which
appears capable of subsisting beyond its being-narrated. A ‘pure narrative’, by contrast,
would be one that renounces this ambition. It might, however, be eclipsed by the material
content of a given narrative, its “novelistic density”.17 While every novel, incidentally,
relies on this narrative gesture so that it can come into being, the very consistency and
self-sufficiency of the narrated world conceals its origin in this gesture. At first sight,
what could be called the ‘autobiographical illusion’ in Proust’s novelistic undertaking is
what  removes  him  furthest  from  the  realisation  of  precisely  this  goal:  “While  the
imaginary journey of narrative leads other writers into the unreality of a scintillating
space, for Marcel Proust everything happens as if it were fortunately superimposed onto
the journey of his actual life.”18 In other words, what appears to be Proust’s ‘actual life’
provides the subject matter, an elusive place exterior to narration, where the reality of
things ensures the consistency of the narrated events. However, the space of Proust’s
narration (which Blanchot goes on to characterise as “imaginary space”19) is anything but
real if reality implies homogeneity and continuity. The narration is unleashed (again and
again)  by  events  that  constitute  a  veritable  short-circuiting  of  a  homogenous  and
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continuous, objective and objectifiable timeline. The material of narration is composed of
what Proust terms ‘sensations’, which essentially consist of a synthesis that, as it were,
“abolishes time”.20
12 Blanchot cites the instance in which the narrator stumbles over the irregular cobbles that
line the Guermantes’ courtyard. He points out that the memory of the stumbling in the
Baptistery of San Marco is by no means a duplication of the original event, but the actual,
original event itself:
Yes,  he [the narrator]  asserts,  time is  abolished,  since,  at  once,  in  a  real  act  of
capturing […] I hold the Venice instant and the Guermantes instant, not a past and
a present, but one single presence that causes incompatible moments, separated by
the entire course of lived life, to coincide in a palpable simultaneity.21
13 This ‘palpable simultaneity’ introduces an irreducibly metaphorical structure into time,
or, more precisely, into the time defined by ‘the entire course of lived life’. ‘Lived life’
thus becomes conceivable as the essence of a separation that fuses two unrelated objects
into one sensation. ‘Sensation’ is nothing but the positive substance of this absence. To be
sure, as a ‘sensation’, this “event” is itself a psychological event, as Blanchot remarks in a
footnote.22 But whose psyche is envisaged here? Who if not the narrator, defined as the
very subject to whom these sensations can be attributed? Transforming these sensations
into narration thus means emptying the space between the instants of recollection – of
involuntary memory – to empty it of everything that entrenches them in the reality of a
conscious subject in the domain of voluntary memory and intelligence. Rather than being
events ‘within’ time, narration transforms those ‘psychological’ entities into fields that
have an extension of their own, an extension in time, but in a transformed time, an
imaginary time, manifesting what Blanchot calls “the incomparable, unique ecstasy of
time.”23
14 Blanchot arranges his argument around a comparison between the style of À la Recherche
du temps perdu, on the one hand, especially the decisive final experience narrated in Le
temps retrouvé, and, on the other hand, a similar event narrated in the posthumously
published novel Jean Santeuil, which could be seen as a precursor or, as Blanchot calls it, a
rejected “draft.”24. For Proust, as Blanchot reads him, Jean Santeuil fails to produce the
experience at which it aims precisely because it preserves a much greater proximity to
the “actual Proust”.25 By contrast, the experience that is at stake for Proust necessitates
the complete metamorphosis of the narrator, through which he not only enters a space of
radical exteriority but also the domain of the whole, which is at once the space of the
image,  and accordingly  the  transformation of  time into  an imaginary  space.26 If  the
Kantian notions of time and space as forms of inner and outer intuition define, in their
clear-cut distinctness, the ability to experience individual, empirical subjectivity, then it
is the merit of Proust’s writing to reflect the becoming-image, the pure exteriority of time
as the essence of writing: “the transformation of time into an imaginary space (the space
unique to images) […]: that remoteness and distance that make up the milieu and the
principle of metamorphoses and of what Proust calls metaphors.”27 Proust’s experience is
thus hermetically enclosed in the psyche of the narrator. But the narrator’s (fictional)
interiority is, in turn, congealed in the radical exteriority of writing, of the narrative and
its temporality.
[T]he time of the narrative, when, although he says ‘I,’ it is no longer the real Proust
or the writer Proust who has the ability to speak, but their metamorphosis into that
shadow that is the narrator turned into a ‘character’ of the book, the one who in
the story writes a story that is the work itself.28
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15 What Proust calls ‘sensation’ is no longer the sensation as it pertains to a self-contained
subject. Rather, its artificiality – part of an “almost sacred reality”29 – reveals its
allegorical  structure,  its  structure as writing.30 Adapting Deleuze’s  thought on desire,
‘pure narrative’ thus seems to mean a narrative that narrates only narrating, i.e.  the
continuous detachment of both the world as subject matter and the self as subject (qua
internal  relation  to  the  world,  qua  representation  etc.)  from  themselves.  This
metamorphosis  of  the  narrator  for  Blanchot  constitutes  the  “movement  of  the  book
toward the work”31 – the œuvre – which is at once, one must add, the manifestation of an
utter  désœuvrement.  Constituting  every  single  thing  as  a  whole,  as  being  one,  the
imaginary seems to be at once the power of the synthesising subject, and the basis of its
utter powerlessness. It is a power, the power to act as a historical, empirical subject so
long as the assembly that governs its desire has not condensed into an appearance, so
long as it is not, strictly speaking, one; but where this power of the subject (the imaginary)
appears as being integrated into one, i.e. wherever it – and with it a whole, empirical,
lived life – becomes the material of a narration, this subjectivity, whilst it is still presented
as historical, owes its being to its utter passivity, its utter separation from history. For
what turns into an image is not this or that object, which would thereby constitute a
mere representation;  rather it  is  the object-relation itself,  that intimate space of  the
empirical subject, which congeals into an image of itself – one that can only take the
shape of pure narration.
16 The twist by which, for Blanchot, Proust transforms the separation from the world into a
positive  experience  –  the  experience  of  pure  narrative  –  echoes  the  way  in  which
Benjamin locates the original problem of Proust at the junction of psychological concerns
and narration. How so?
 
Benjamin (II): Involuntary memory and “the issueless
private character of Man’s inner concerns”
17 In his study “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Benjamin introduces Proust as an heir to
Henri Bergson, linking his novelistic project to the latter’s notion of duration – ‘durée’ –
as developed in Matière et Mémoire. As Bergson’s title indicates, the concept of duration as
experienced time is closely intertwined with a theory of memory. However, Benjamin reads
Bergson’s  attempt  to  establish  a  theoretical  account  of  experience  against  the
background of a historical situation that is marked by the progressive and irretrievable
loss of experience. Situating him within the context of the nineteenth century tradition
of a philosophy of life [Lebensphilosophie] which stretches from Dilthey to Klages and Jung,
Benjamin points  out  that  Bergson’s  own attempt to restore an authentic  experience,
which  is  fundamentally  different  from its  current  forms  in  the  “standardized,
denaturated life of the civilized masses”,32 nonetheless disavows the very particularity of
the social situation out of which, and against which it was deployed. Indeed, according to
Benjamin, Bergson’s philosophy has to be regarded as the “afterimage”, which appears to
the  eye  when  it  shuts  out  the  experience  of  the  “age  of  big-scale  industrialism”.33
Benjamin’s formulations here suggest that the very structure of duration as a form of
experience  requires  one  to  think  about  the  nexus  between  poetic  fiction  and  the
structure  of  subjectivity  that  it  implies:  “Matière  et  mémoire defines  the  nature  of
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experience in the durée in such a way that the reader is bound to conclude that only a
poet can be the adequate subject of such an experience.”34
18 Unlike  Blanchot,  Benjamin  does  not  explicitly  differentiate  between  the  poet  as  a
(historical) subject and poetic subjectivity, nor does he explicitly name the problem of the
narrator, and of narrative, as being crucial to the argument. But it is the same space that
Benjamin envisages, one in which narrative is detached from any related object or event,
from a self-contained experience beyond narration,  where,  therefore,  it  affects every
narrated object in its very objecthood. Reformulating Benjamin’s assertion, it is thus the
desœuvrement for  which  poetic  subjectivity  provides  the  model,  which  defines  the
structure of Bergson’s concept of experience. However, while Proust’s project shares the
social and historical determinants of Bergson’s philosophy, Bergson’s merely theoretical
approach treats an (ultimately unavailable) experience as if it was immediately available.
By contrast, it is Proust’s fundamental ambition to produce the experience in question
artificially or, as Benjamin writes, synthetically:  “Proust’s work À la Recherche du temps
perdu may be regarded as an attempt to produce experience synthetically, as Bergson
imagines it, under today’s conditions, for there is less and less hope that it will come into
being naturally.”35
19 Benjamin repeatedly suggests that Proust’s work should be considered as beginning with
the utter artificiality of the narrative situation which it presupposes. If this production of
synthetic experience takes the shape of a comprehensive attempt “to restore the figure of
the storyteller to the present generation,”36 then it is because for Benjamin the practice
of storytelling is the epitome of that synthetizing activity that constitutes the notion of
experience as embedded in a life: “[i]t is not the object of the story to convey a happening
per  se,  which  is  the  purpose  of  information;  rather,  it  embeds  it  in  the  life  of  the
storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening.”37 Here, the storyteller’s
life as an organic whole composed of meaningful elements is what brings forth the story
as a meaningful, coherent experience, i.e. as narration: “It [the story] bears the marks of
the  storyteller  much as  the  earthen  vessel  bears  the  marks  of  the  potter’s  hand.”38
However, the marks of the storyteller’s life in Benjamin’s analogy would be an element
that precisely hinders the completion of what Blanchot called the ‘metamorphosis of the
narrator’. The ‘restoration’ of the storyteller that Benjamin emphasises has to take into
account  the  fundamental  transformation  that  he,  the  storyteller,  undergoes  in  this
process:  as  a  “figure”,  where  the  “resurrection  of  the  past”  takes  the  shape  of  the
“imaginary past of an already entirely imaginary being.”39 The fact that, according to
Benjamin, it is a restoration “to the present generation” highlights the historical index
that determines the specific experience at stake, experience “under today’s conditions.”40
20 In Benjamin, this problem shines through; for there is a peculiar equivocation in the
concept of synthesis as Benjamin applies it, one that scintillates in his use of the notion of
synthetic experience. On the one hand, there is the synthesis that constitutes the unity of
the related event by embedding it in the storyteller’s life, making him, as it were, the
transcendental subject of the narrative,  where what is narrated – what is related – is
precisely the relation to the subject. In this sense, which comes close to the concept of
Kantian transcendental synthesis, experience can only be synthetic, i.e. the result of a
synthesis.  Proust’s  narrative,  on the other hand,  works differently,  as  we have seen,
following Blanchot.  By reducing narration to ‘pure narrative’,  where every residue of
voluntary memory vanishes in favour of that “outpouring of the imagination in which a
field is  established between [past  and present]”41 –  as  it  characterises the essence of
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involuntary memory – distant points “separated by the entire course of lived life”42 come
to constitute a life, ultimately life as a whole, but a life entirely immanent to narration, in
an  imaginary  space  entirely  disconnected  from  the  storyteller’s,  i.e.  the  (empirical)
writers’ life.
21 Storytelling is thus a kind of synthesis. It brings about the cohesion of past and present
generations.  But  the  synthetic  reduplication  of  this  gesture  of  storytelling  –  the
transformation of the life of the storyteller into the figure of the storyteller – seems to
produce a very specific conception of what, for Proust, ‘the present generation’ was. For
Benjamin,  it  is  the perceived unavailability of  a primordial  mode of  narration which
encapsulates  the experience of  technological  progress.  The separation of  generations
from each other – which ensues from the ever increasing speed at which any knowledge
linked to living environments seems to make the very essence of the story obsolete. This
essence lies  in the quality  of  speaking to the listener by virtue of  the marks of  the
storyteller’s life that the story makes on its fabric.  Viewed against this backdrop, art
mobilises  its  resources  precisely  as  a  consequence  of  the  unavailability  of  such
exteriority.43 The  relations  of  subject and  world,  of  past  events  and  the  listener’s
experience,  thus  need  to  be  reproduced  artificially.  The  structure  of  Proust’s
“autobiographical  work”  as  an  “unconstruable  synthesis”44 has  the  same  status  for
Benjamin as  for  Blanchot:  the  status  of  a  synthetic  life –  a  life  detached from every
particular life. As a work it materialises this very detachment, and where it takes the form
of pure narrative,  it  (re)produces life as  absolute interiority,  as completely contained
within the work. In this way, the idea of involuntary memory, epitomising this reduction
to pure narrative by excluding every element of command from a subject, carries the
index of the historic situation, which is that of the loss of the subjective ability to narrate:
It is by no means evident to be dependent on chance in this matter [of taking hold
of one’s experience through recollection]. Man’s inner concerns do not have their
issueless  private  character  by  nature.  They  do  so  only  when he  is  increasingly
unable to assimilate the data of the world around him by way of experience.45
22 Here, what Blanchot characterised as ‘novelistic density’ amounts to the striving for a
complete self-subsistence of life within the work. Benjamin’s formulation is therefore
deceptive.  There  can  be  no  simple  restoration of  storytelling  and of  the  storyteller;
instead, their historical relevance lies in the fact that, for Benjamin, ‘restoration’ is at
once a fundamental transformation, a metamorphosis of the very essence of storytelling.
Blanchot, for his part, argues that Proust’s work should be read as the “metamorphosis of
the narrator turned into a ‘character’ of the book, the one who in the story writes a story
that is the work itself”.46 The storyteller as a ‘figure’ can no longer leave his life’s marks
on the story; rather, this life re-emerges within the narration, as a token of a natural
history collection, as the narrated life of a narrator that is inseparable from narration.
But narration, in turn, has retreated to, or rather constituted a space that, by virtue of its
pure inanimate exteriority,  acquires an utterly unreal and inaccessible dimension: an
image of life.47 Viewed in this way, immanence amounts to pure exteriority.
23 In his 1929 essay on “The Image of Proust”, Benjamin characterises Proust’s writing as a
“Penelope work of recollection” that is really a “Penelope work of forgetting”, where “the
day unravels  what  the night” has  “woven.”48 It  is  not  only Benjamin and Blanchot’s
common reference to the myth of Ulysses,49 which highlights the affinity between their
respective readings of Proust. While Blanchot sets out to tackle the question of a ‘pure
narrative’, Benjamin shifts his attention from the subject matter of this or that narrated
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memory to the “actus purus of recollection itself”.50 Only this pure act of recollection, “not
the author of the plot”, as Benjamin explicitly points out, is what “constitutes the unity of
the text.”51 Here, the synthesis in question – as we have seen, Benjamin describes Proust’s
work as an ‘unconstruable synthesis’ – appears to be formulated in the vocabulary of
textual  metaphors:  the  “tapestry  of  lived life”,52 which is  woven by recollecting and
forgetting,  derives its  figurative persuasiveness from the Latin word textum (web),  as
Benjamin reminds us.  What he observes in Proust is the dissolution of the subject of
recollection into textuality. But what exactly does this mean?
 
Blanchot (II): Empty Totality
24 Following Blanchot, we have seen that the exteriority entailed by writing53 creates an
‘almost  sacred  reality’,  one  that  could  be  thought  of  in  terms  of  the  structure  that
Benjamin assigns to allegory. The internal space defined by what Proust calls ‘sensation’
appears to be the object of narration. But in its artificiality, at least as Benjamin presents
it,  this allegedly internal space reveals itself  as the shadow, or rather,  the peculiarly
motionless  image  of  real  sensation  –  provided  that  such  realness is  understood  as  a
sensation’s belonging to an individual self. Presenting itself as the image of a psyche, this
pure  recollection  becomes  legible  as  the  materialisation  of  the  very  absence  of  any
individual self. Pure recollection is not recollection of a self but rather recollection in spite
of a self. The involuntary memory, of which Proust’s narrator seems to be the subject, is in
fact realised as the continuous (self-)abdication of a subjecthood that is transformed into
narration. What appears as the immanence of pure recollection thus poses a boundary
value (a property of the image, as Blanchot conceives it) that marks the point where the
reader’s  desire  for  immersion  into  the  fictional  world  as  well  as  identification  with
fictional  characters  must  necessarily be  disappointed.54 Memory,  as  far  as  Proust  is
concerned, has to do with the text’s resistance to empathy with the narrator and his
characters.55 Consequently, Proust’s project, as Benjamin understands it, cannot be seen
as addressing the realm of (psychological) interiority and hence of subjectivity as such.
Rather, “man’s inner concerns”,56 by dint of their construction as pure narration, are
turned  inside  out;  the  psyche is  inverted  into  physis.  Benjamin  emphasises  Proust’s
striving to “design the entire inner structure of society as a physiology of chatter.”57
Society,  when congealed  into  an  image  –  a  totality  –  presents  itself  as  nature,  as  a
“petrefied, primordial landscape.”58 And it is this imaginary dimension of society as a
totality, which reveals the nexus of fate and writing. For wherever the writing of fate is
supposed  to  be  situated,  the  idea  is  always  that  of  a  codification  that  ultimately
encompasses  a  totality,  which,  by  its  sheer  density,  immobilises  every element.  This
applies to Proust’s characters:
Proust’s characters, which are planted so firmly in their social habitat, influenced
by the position of the sun of aristocratic favour, stirred by the wind that blows from
Guermantes or Méséglise, and inextricably intertwined in the thicket of their fate.59 
25 It  is  a  “vegetative  existence”60 that  pertains  to  these  characters,  while  the  narrator,
rather than presenting a subjective interiority, can be thought of as the ferment by which
this nexus is transformed into an image. Physis, nature, is therefore what things turn into
when viewed in their totality, or as totality, and absolute narrative thus meets at least
one demand that Adorno formulates when he writes about “The Idea of Natural History”,
namely to “comprehend historical being in its most extreme historical determinacy, where it is
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most historical, as natural”.61 Conversely, the appearance of intentionality, and therefore of
action,  spontaneity,  and subjectivity qua praxis,  can be understood as the result  of  a
subtraction, the not-all that would characterise actual, i.e. lived, unformed life.
26 Benjamin and Blanchot both suggest that fiction in modernity constitutes the medium of
totality.  For  Benjamin,  once  again,  it  is  the  integrating  quality  of  what  was  once
experience, which Proust’s novelistic project seeks to achieve artificially.  Blanchot, in
turn, focuses on the instant of separation, in which experience, thus conceived as fiction,
cuts itself off from a world in which experiencing, acting beings could subsist and which,
by virtue of its very unavailability, can be termed real and historical. For Blanchot, the
totality  that  fiction  constitutes  qua  pure  narrative  is  therefore  never  a  totality  of 
something but rather a pure totality, even if its manifestations may be fragmentary. It is a
universal  negation,  severed  from  the  realm  of  determinate  negation,  which  would
constitute subjectivity and thus action. A ‘vegetative existence’, such as the mode of being
that Benjamin ascribes to Proust’s characters – one that entails the inability to act as a
subject – derives from the peculiar inactivity, which, according to Blanchot, defines the
writer as “master of the imaginary.”62 In a much more general sense, Blanchot makes the
point that the world as a whole – and, when mediated by the experience of a narrator, life
as a whole – is at the same time less than the world, less than life:
The truth is that he [the writer] ruins action, not because he deals with what is
unreal but because he makes all of reality available to us. Unreality begins with the
whole.  The realm of  the imaginary is  not  a  strange region situated beyond the
world, it is the world itself, but as entire, manifold, the world as a whole. That is
why it  is  not  in  the  world,  because  it  is  the  world,  grasped and realized in  its
entirety by the global negation of all the individual realities contained in it, by their
disqualification, their absence, by the realization of that absence itself,  which is
how literary creation begins […].63
27 The writer is thus the model of an inability to act precisely because the global negation by
which every fictional sentence negates the world as a whole through language, whilst also
negating language as a whole by making it an image of language, leaves no room for
action.  It  is  this  sudden  transformation  that  Blanchot  repeatedly  describes  as  “
désœuvrement”,64 an  inability  that  ultimately  characterises  every  notion  of  individual
selfhood in modernity, because such selfhood cannot persist without becoming entangled
in  the  medium  of  the  imaginary.65 But  perhaps  the  very  materialisation  of  this
entanglement may bear the promise of breaking this spell? If,  for Benjamin, Proust’s
mémoire involontaire constitutes a time outside of history [geschichtslos], then it is Blanchot
who focuses on literary creation – the ‘space of literature’ – as an interstice between the
realms  of  nature  and  history.  His  theory  of  the  “two  versions  of  the  imaginary”66
concerns this very nexus.
28 Proust attempts “to produce experience synthetically […] under today’s conditions, for
there is less and less hope that it will come into being naturally.”67 But by making all of it
available, what becomes available is, in a certain sense, its very unavailability: the empty
totality of a world and a life that is completely self-sufficient. ‘Under today’s conditions’
means, at once, that he produces the psychology of experience as an image of experience
that exposes the mythic fabric of the psyche itself. Such an image simultaneously exposes
the passivity of the individual self as it emerges from people’s separation from economic
production, while the dissimulation of this very separation makes for the appearance of
spontaneity  and  individual  selfhood.  When  considered  against  the  backdrop  of  the
complete unavailability of primordial, unmediated experience, which Benjamin describes,
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what appeared at first sight as the image of a psyche, reveals the psyche as image. To say,
as Benjamin does, that Proust’s work produces experience synthetically therefore means
that it produces an absolute experience, and therefore an immanent experience – one
that refuses to be the experience of a subject which transcends the work. Such a claim is
in accordance with Benjamin’s critical intention, developed early on in his essay “On The
Program of  the  Coming  Philosophy”,  which  contains  a  reading  of  Kant’s  concept  of
experience  under  the  aspect  of  eliminating  “the  subject  nature  of  the  cognizing
consciousness”68 as one of the “primitive elements of an unproductive metaphysics.” 69
Contrary to Deleuze’s view of desire, which is informed by Proust’s theory of memory, it
has to be said that if desire does in fact occur within an assembly, an agencement, which –
in Proust’s case – takes the shape of pure narrative, then one (i.e. a conscious subject) can
only  experience  one’s  exclusion from desire,  one’s  separation from it.  Reading (as  a
subject) therefore means to experience this limitation of experience, to experience this
withdrawal and refusal; and if subjective experience operates via synthesis, then it is the
experience of a moment of “nonsynthesis”70 that comes into focus here. The synthetic
experience brought about in Proust’s work is therefore nothing less than the realisation
of what Benjamin elsewhere describes as “profane illumination”,71 one that reveals the
effects of “that most terrible drug – ourselves – which we take in solitude.”72
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ABSTRACTS
The  article  seeks  to  delineate  a  correspondence  between  Walter  Benjamin  and  Maurice
Blanchot’s  accounts  of  subjectivity  through the  prism of  their  respective  readings  of  Marcel
Proust. While Benjamin focuses on the peculiar artificiality of experience produced in Proust’s
Recherche,  Blanchot gives an account of the transformation of the narrator, which produces a
‘pure narrative’  and thus turns subjective  interiority  outward into writing.  By relating their
approaches to the problem of totality, Benjamin and Blanchot both indicate a concept of history,
and of historical cognition, which is linked to the problem of writing, of fiction or narration and
to a specific understanding of the literary work.
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